Helen Jane Walters v. Lewis Mark Walters : Brief in Opposition to Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Helen Jane Walters v. Lewis Mark Walters : Brief in
Opposition to Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Thomas H. Means; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin; Attorney for Petitioner.
Robert L. Moody; Taylor, Moody & Thorne; Attorney for Respondent .
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Walters v. Walters, No. 910316.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3618
UTAH 
fcOCUWtESt 
KFU 
ffcfc 
JSTAH SUPREMb U U U K i 
BRJEfi 
^ ( 0 3 ( ^ 
Robert L. Moody, #2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Respondent 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone 801-373-2721 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JANE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 910316 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
APPEAL FROM THE DECREE OF DIVORCE OF THE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING, SR., PRESIDING 
THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Attorney for Petitioner 
ROBERT L. MOODY, #2 302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorney for Respondent 
F I L E D 
SEP 3 1991 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
Robert L. Moody, #2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Respondent 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone 801-373-2721 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JANE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Supreme Court No, 910316 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
APPEAL FROM THE DECREE OF DIVORCE OF THE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING, SR., PRESIDING 
THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
ROBERT L. MOODY, #2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorney for Petitioner Attorney for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Authorities iit-
Questions Presented For Review L 
Controlling Statutes 1 
Statement of the Case L 
A. Nature of the Case 1 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 1 
C. Statement of Facts 4 
Summary of the Argument ' 7 
Argument 8 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY REVIEWED THE TRIAL 
COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR CORRECTNESS AND PROPERLY 
DISTURBED THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION ON THE BASIS THAT 
THERE WAS A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION 8 
POINT II. 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER, UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, A 
MARRIED COUPLE'S PERIOD OF COHABITATION PRIOR TO THE 
SOLEMNIZATION OF THEIR MARRIAGE CAN BE CONSIDERED A PART 
OF THEIR MARRIAGE, IS NOT A SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT REASON 
FOR THE UTAH SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW AS A MATTER OF FIRST 
IMPRESSION, NOR IS THE QUESTION RIPE FOR REVIEW. . 11 
Appendix 14 
A. Walters v. Walters, 160 Ut. A.iv. Rep. 47 
B. Trial Court's Memorandum Decision of February 15, ^989 
C. Second Memorandum Decision of Trial Court - July 3±, 1989 
D. Trial Court's written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law 
i 
E. Amended Decree of Divorce of October 30, 1989 
F. Utah Code Annnotated, Section 30-1-4.5 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutes 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-1-4.5 1,8,9, 
Cases 
Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d 504, 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . 9, 
Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) . . . 
Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177, 118L (Utah Ct. App. 198^j9, 
Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utan Ct. App. 1989) . . . 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 10/0 (Utah 1985) . . . . 
Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) . 9, 
Walters v. Walters, 160 Ut. Adv. Rep. M Appendi 
iii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR TOE STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JANE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 91011 6 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the Utah Court oi Appeals er. by -lu^-t^*^ 
incorrect standards of review? 
II. Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court ot Ucan to 
determine whether Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-L-4.5 is to be 
applied retroactively? 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-1-4.5, Reproduced m 
Appendix F. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. This is an action for divorce 
involving the distribution of real and personal property a£ vveLl 
as an award for attorney's fees. 
B. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BLLOW. On 
October 26, 1987, the Petitioner/Plaintiff filed a Complaint for 
divorce. (R.l). On February 7, 1989, the parties appeared before 
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the Honorable Ray M. Harding for purposes of terminating tne 
marriage and dividing real and personal property. (R.3-4j. 
Following the trial, Judge Harding entered a Memorandum 
Decision finding "that the parties be^an to carry on a marriage 
like relationship on or about January 1, 1980, which was several 
years before the marriage was actually solemnized." (R.99). 
From the established date of January 1, 19bu, Jud«je 
Harding found that the Plaintiff wa.3 entitled to a :;nare of 
Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the existence of the 
marriage. The formula used to apportion the Plaintiff's snare )£ 
the retirement benefits was derived from Marcnant v. Marchant, 7-13 
P.2d 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), which takes into consideration the 
number of years or months in which the parties were married. 
(R.100). 
With regards to the distribution of real property, in its 
Memorandum Decision dated February 15, 1989, the trial court found 
that the real property acquired after January 1, 1980, was marital 
property and proceeded to divide the same on an equitable basis. 
(R.101). 
On July 31, 1989, the trial court, in it.s second 
Memorandum Decision, awarded the Plaintiff ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($1,000.00) for attorney's fees "based on need and the relative 
ability of the parties to pay.11 (R.115). Prior to this decision, 
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it was represented to the Court that the Plaintiff was totally seLf 
supported from income earned from her employment at Geneva SteeL, 
(R.lll), and as incorporated in the Findings of Fact, it was found 
that neither party appeared to be in present need of or entitled 
to the continuing financial support of the other, either in tne 
form of alimony or child support. (R.149). 
The foregoing Memorandums were incorporated in a:. Amended 
Decree of Divorce (R.168). 
On November 9, 1989, the Defendant filed his Notice of 
Appeal from the decision rendered by Judge Harding. (R.17-2). 
Upon the conclusion of oral argument and briefing, the 
Utah Court of Appeals issued its opinion on the 14th day of May, 
1991. (See Appendix A). In such opinion, the Utah Court of 
Appeals concluded as a matter of law that the parties' marriage 
began on October 5, 1984, the date of its solemnization, and that 
the property acquired before that date was pre-marital property, 
and property acquired after that date was marital property. 
(Appendix A, Page 5). The case was remanded to the trial court to 
make sufficiently detailed findings and to properly categorize the 
parties1 property as being part of the marital estate or as 
separate property, and then equitably distributing the property. 
As a starting point, the Defendant is entitled to the real property 
acquired before the parties1 marriage, and a 50 percent interest 
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in the real property acquired after the marriage. (Appendix A, 
Page 6), Also, the Court of Appeals reversed the triai court's 
award of attorney's fees after reviewing the record, stating that 
it was "clear Helen Walters failed to demonstrate her need to an 
award of attorney's fees." (Appendix A, Page 7). 
The Plaintiff subsequently filed her Ex Parte Motion for 
Enlargement of Time followed by her Petition for Writ; of Certiorari 
on the 30th day of July, 1991. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. The Plaintiff ana Defendant met 
in December of 1978 at which time, the Plaintiff, and her t>vo year 
old daughter from a previous marriage, resided in her traiier which 
was located in Orem, Utah. (Tr.15,30-31). The Defendant, working 
for the United States Air Force, was frequently called to work on 
Temporary Duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided missiLe 
sites. (Tr.92). The Defendant resided in several states from 19/8 
through 1974 because of these TDY assignments. During this, period, 
he resided in Montana, Missouri, South Dakota, Wyoming and North 
Dakota. (Exh.10) (Tr.72-74,92) . While the Defendant resided In 
these several states from 1978 through 1984, he made infrequent 
returns to Utah. (Tr.53). During this period, the Defendant 
maintained a habitual trailer in Highland, Utah, of wnich the 
water, gas, and utilities were always nooked up. (Tr.53-54/. 
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However, when the Defendant would return to Utah, he lived with the 
Plaintiff in her trailer. (Tr. 54). 
In July of 1977, the Defendant acquired real property In 
Highland, Utah. (Tr.94) (Exh.ll). Said final payment for chis 
property was made by the Defendant on May 23, 1981. i Tr.94) 
(Exh.14). 
When the parties first met, the Plaintiff resided in her 
trailer in Orem, Utah. In May of 1980, the Defendant purchased, 
in his own name, a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant 
Grove, Utah. (Tr.96) (Exh.15). At that time, the parties meed the 
Plaintiff's mobile trailer onto that property. The Defenaani paid 
for the cost of moving the trailer to the Pleasant Grove location 
as well as the costs incurred for culinary water anc sewer 
connections. (Tr.96). From that time forward, the Fiaintiff 
continually resided in her trailer at that location. The Defendant 
paid for substantial improvements at this site. (Tr.37,9c . The 
Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rer.t for the placement of her 
trailer on the pad or for her use of tne realty as ner residence. 
(Tr.39). The Plaintiff was able to use her resources tor the 
everyday necessities for herself and her daughter sucn as 
groceries, utilities, and trailer payments. (Tr.39). 
Prior to and after the Plainciff moved her trailer onto 
Defendant's lot, the Defendant assisted the Plaintiff by paying a 
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number of debts and obligations of the Plaintiff's totalling TEN 
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE DOLLARS ($10,371.00) of which 
the Defendant made no claims for nor expected anything in return. 
(Tr.88,105). At the time the Defendant paid these expenses, there 
was not an arrangement with regard to a marital relationsnip. 
In the Fall of 1981/ with the Defendant's knowledge, the 
Plaintiff enrolled her daughter in school under the last .iame ,f 
Walters. (Tr.42-43,107 ) • 
From 1978 through 1983, the Plaintiff filed r.er tax-
returns under the name of Hunter, the name from her previous 
marriage. (Tr.49-52) (Exh.3). Not until 1984, the year :nat the 
parties were married, did the parties file a joint tax return. 
(Tr.52). 
Prior to their marriage in 3 984, the Plaintiff and tiie 
Defendant kept separate checking accounts of which the Defendant 
never intermingled his money with the Plaintiff's. (Tr.58). 
Nevertheless, the Defendant would periodically help the Plaintiff 
by paying her debts and obligations. (Tr.58-59) (Ex.13). 
In July of 1984, the Plaintiff joined the Defendant LII 
North Dakota where the parties resided together. (Tr.44,72). On 
October 5, 1984, the parties were married in Manitoba, Canada. 
(Tr.ll). 
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On July 19, 1985, the Defendant, with his own fund.*, 
acquired in his name a parcel of property located at 640 South 50 
West in Pleasant Grove, Utah. (Tr.99) (Ex.11,16). This property 
was in the same trailer park facility as the 625 South 50 West 
property of which the parties lived. In October 1985, L-c::endant 
placed his trailer on that property. (Tr.100). Defendant h.id 
purchased such trailer in 1977 which he had kept in highland, Ucai:. 
(Tr.101). At the time of trial, (Febraary 1989) the 640 S utn •)() 
West property had an encumbrance of $5,000.00. (Tr.81) v£:-..il). 
During the marriage, differences between the parties 
developed resulting in their separation on or about Novemoer 10, 
1987. (R.149). 
At the time the parties met, the Plaintiff was employed 
by Geneva Steel. This employment continued except for a period 
when Geneva Steel ceased operations. At the time or trial, 
Plaintiff had been reemployed by Geneva Steel for approximately 
one (1) year. (Tr.36-37). While living at 625 South 50 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, the Plaintiff contributed her earnings 
towards the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living 
expenses. (R.151). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiff challenges the Utah Court of Appeals' 
application of well established standards of review. However, the 
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Plaintiff fails to acknowledge that the Utah Court of AppeaLs 
reviewed the legal conclusions of the trial court in rendering its 
decision and did not base its decision on the factual findings of 
the trial court. An appellate court accords conclusions of law 
with no particular deference, but reviews them for correctness. 
That is what the Court of Appeals did in reviewing this case-. in 
any event, the Utah Court of Appeals did not consider the factual 
findings of the trial court in conflict with established standar-.is 
of review as the Plaintiff argues. 
This case does not present a special or important reason 
for the Utah Supreme Court to review as a matter or first 
impression. The Plaintiff asks the Court to settle the question 
of whether, in appropriate circumstances, a married couple's period 
of cohabitation prior to the solemnization of their marriage can 
be considered a part of their marriage. Under the facts of this 
case, the Plaintiff is asking the Utah Supreme Court to apply Utah 
Code Annotated Section 30-1-4.5, Utah's common law marriage 
statute, retroactively. The Utah Court of Appeals has already 
ruled that Section 30-1-4.5 may not be applied retroactively. 
Section 30-1-4.5 was not enacted until 1987, subsequent to the time 
of the disputed events of this case. Because the purported 
marriage-like relationship occurred before 1987, the Plaintiffs 
question, whether a married couple's period of cohabitation prior 
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to the solemnization of their marriage can be considered a part of 
their marriage, is not ripe for the Utah Supreme Court to review 
under the facts of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY REVIEWED 
THE TRIAL COURT*S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR 
CORRECTNESS AND PROPERLY DISTURBED THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION ON THE BASIS THAT THERE WAS 
A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The Utah Court of Appeals determined that tne trial 
court, in distributing the parties1 property, found that tne 
parties began to carry on a marriage like relationship on or about 
January 1, 1980. In its review of Utah case law, the Utan Court 
of Appeals ruled that the parties' relationship could not be 
treated as a marriage prior to its solemnization which occurred on 
October 5, 1984. The Utah Court of Appeals had previously ruled 
that "before adoption of Section 30-1-4.5 in 1987, Utah did not 
recognize an unsolemnized relationship as a marriage, even though 
the parties to the relationship may have acted in other respects 
as spouses." Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d 504, 505 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). The Utah Court of Appeals once again pointed :ut th.it 
Section 30-1-4.5 may not be applied retroactively. Lay ton, at 50v.">. 
Under Utah law, the Utah Court of Appeals properly concluded as a 
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matter of law that the Walter's marriage began on October 5, 198 4, 
the date of its solemnization, and that the property acquired 
before that date should be treated as pre-marital property, and 
property acquired after that date should be treated as marital 
property. It was appropriate for the Utah Court of Appeals to 
disturb the trial court's decision as the trial court's application 
of the law was a clear abuse of discretion. Smith v. Smith, 7 M 
P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Court of AppeaLs 
followed the established principles that an appellate COLIC is to 
accord conclusions of law with no particular deference, but snouLd 
review them for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d iU6d, 
1070 (Utah 1985) . 
As stated above, the Defendant maintains that trie Utah 
Court of Appeals used the appropriate standard of review
 a..o that 
as a matter of law, the trial court clearly abused its discretion. 
(Appendix A, Page 3). Citing Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1 1 ^ , il)i 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) . 
Because the issues involved in this case are questions 
of law and not of fact, the Utah Court of Appeals did not ccr.sider 
the factual findings of the trial court in a manner which conflicts 
with established standards of review. There is not an lSi^e as to 
whether the trial court's findings of fact are clearly errjneoui. 
The issue is whether the trial court's application of the law was 
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a clear abuse of discretion. The Utah Court of Appeals determined 
that there was a clear abuse of discretion. Because the issues 
involved in this case are a question of law and not of fact, the 
issue of marshalling of the evidence is also inapplicable in this 
case. 
With regard to the Plaintiff's assertion that the 
Defendant did not preserve the issue of attorney's fees foi appeal, 
the reasoning of the Plaintiff is also unsound. Once again, the 
real issue is a question of law. To award attorney's fees., a trial 
court must find that the requesting party is in need of rinanci.il 
assistance and that the fees requested are reasonaole. Riche v. 
Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Though there was 
evidence in the record finding that the attorney's fees awarded 
were reasonable, there was no evidence in the record demonstrating 
the Plaintiff's need for an award of attorney's fee. As a .natter 
of law, the appellate court was able to determine that mere was 
a clear abuse of discretion in awarding attorney's fees without 
proper evidence indicating a need for such. It was not tne duty 
of the Defendant to apprise the trial court during trial tnat tne 
Plaintiff failed to demonstrate her need for an award of attorney's 
fees. To do so, would jeopardize his position. Tne trial court 
did not render its decision, awarding attorney's fees, until aftt-r 
the trial in a separate Memorandum Decision, thus not affording the 
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Defendant the opportunity to make an objection for purposes of 
preservation for appeal. 
Because the Utah Court of Appeals used the proper 
standard of review with regard to the question of law at issue, it 
is not necessary nor proper for the Utah Supreme Court to review 
the Court of Appeal's decision. 
POINT II 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER, UNDER THESE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, A MARRIED COUPLE'S PERIOD OF 
COHABITATION PRIOR TO THE SOLEMNIZATION OF 
THEIR MARRIAGE CAN BE CONSIDERED A PART OF 
THEIR MARRIAGE, IS NOT A SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT 
REASON FOR THE UTAH SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW AS 
A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION, NOR IS THE 
QUESTION RIPE FOR REVIEW. 
Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 30-1-4.5, was not enacted until 1987. In the instant case, 
the Utah Court of Appeals pointed out that before the adoption of 
Section 30-1-4.5, "Utah did not lecognize an unsolemnized 
relationship as a marriage, even though the parties to the 
relationship may have acted in other respects as. spouses." 
(Appendix A, Page 5); Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d, 504, 505 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (Citing Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177, 13 81 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988)). Also, the Court of Appeals pointed out the 
Section 30-1-4.5 may not be applied retroactively. Lay ton, at 50'). 
Under this established Utah law, the Court of Appeals concluded as 
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a matter of law that the Walter's relationship could not be created 
as a marriage prior to its solemnization on October 5, 19 6*. 
What the Plaintiff is seeking the Utah Supreme C^rt i:c 
do at this juncture is to reconsider whether Section 30-X-4.5 is 
to be applied retroactively. This question has already oeen 
addressed and ruled upon by the Utah Court of Appeals. Layton, at 
505; Mattes, at 1181. The Court of Appeals' reasoning, in ruling 
that Section 30-1-4.5 may not be applied retroactively, was sound, 
and it is not necessary for the Utah Supreme Court to reucw, 
The Plaintiff challenges the provision of Sect:c:i JO-L-
4.5(2) which provides that "the determination or establishment of 
a marriage under this section must occur during the relationship 
described in sub-section (1), or within one year following tne 
termination of that relationship." However, the unsclemnized 
relationship in the instant case occurred prior to 1987, tne date 
Section 30-1-4.5 was enacted. Because the unsclemnized 
relationship occurred prior to 1987, the Plaintiff's challenge of 
Section 30-1-4.5(2) is not ripe for the Supreme Court to decide. 
Because Section 30-1-4.5 is not to be applied 
retroactively, and that challenging Section 30-1-4.5(2) is not ripe 
under the facts of this case, it is not appropriate for the Supreme 
Court of Utah to review the Court of Appeals' decision or this 
case. 
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DATED this 30 day of August, 1991. 
iU-^z. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX "A' FILED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
Helen Jayne Walters, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
MAY 141991 
£ ^ $ U ^ 
Lewis Mark Walters, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Clerk of tfrftQamtt 
OPINION ^ * ^ 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890671-CA 
F I L E D 
(May 14, 1991) 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Ray M. Harding 
Attorneys: Robert 
Thomas 
L. 
H. 
Moody, 
Means, 
Provo, 
Provo, 
for Appellant 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellant, Lewis Mark Walte 
an amended decree of divorce awa 
Walters (Helen Walters) a share 
proportionate share of Mark Walt 
attorney fees. Mark Walters cha 
grounds: (1) the trial court er 
relationship between the parties 
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attorney fees where there was no 
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bring this appeal. 
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rding appellee, 
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ers's retiremen 
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evidence of fi 
f Mark Walters1 
s), appeals from 
Helen Jane 
realty, a 
t benefits, and 
ree on two 
hing a marital 
1980 until 
by awarding 
nancial need, 
s standing to 
1. Helen Walters argues that Mark Walters is without standing 
because, after trial and prior to this appeal, he transferred 
to third parties his interests in the real properties at 
issue. However, her challenge to Mark Walters1s standing is 
premised upon alleged transactions which took place subsequent 
to the trial court's memorandum decision and which are not part 
of the trial record or the record on appeal. Hence, appellee's 
remedy, if any, regarding those transactions lies in the trial 
court. 
FACTS 
Helen Walters and Mark Walters met in late 1978. Helen 
Walters, was then, and at all relevant times, employed at 
Geneva Steel. Mark Walters was employed by the United States 
Air Force and was frequently assigned temporary duty 
assignments out of state. When he would return to Utah for 
visits, Mark Walters lived with Helen Walters in her trailer. 
Mark Walters also maintained a habitable trailer on property 
(Parcel 1) he owned prior to meeting Helen Walters, in 
Highland, Utah. Parcel 1 had been purchased by Mark Walters in 
1977 and he made final payment on it in 1981. 
In addition to Parcel 1, Mark Walters owned a trailer pad 
at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah (Parcel 2). This 
had been purchased in his name in 1980. Helen Walters's mobile 
trailer was moved to Parcel 2 in 1980. Mark Walters paid all 
the expenses incurred as result of that move. Helen Walters 
arranged for and participated in improvements to this property 
and Mark Walters paid for those improvements. 
From 1978 through 1983, Helen Walters filed her separate 
tax returns under the name of Hunter. Her daughter, Shantel, 
from a previous marriage, resided with Helen and Mark Walters, 
and was enrolled in school under the last name of Walters. In 
addition Mark Walters contributed to Shantel's financial 
support. Mark Walters's 1982 through 1984 federal income tax 
returns listed Shantel as a dependent living with him. In 
1984, the parties were ceremoniously married and they filed a 
joint income tax return. Prior to 1984, the parties maintained 
separate checking accounts. 
In July 1985, Mark Walters purchased a third trailer pad 
located at 640 South 50 West in Pleasant Grove, Utah (Parcel 
3). This property was in the same trailer park as "Parcel 2. 
In October 1985, he moved his trailer from Parcel 1 in 
Highland, Utah, to Parcel 3. 
On October 26, 1987, Helen Walters filed for divorce, and 
on February 7, 1989, the parties appeared before the trial 
court to terminate their marriage and divide their real and 
personal property. Following the trial, the court issued a 
memorandum decision finding "that the parties began to carry on 
a marriage-like relationship on or about January 1, 1980, jwhich 
was several years before the marriage was actually 
solemnized." The court determined that Helen Walters was to 
receive Parcel 2 in Pleasant Grove where her mobile home was 
located. Mark Walters was to keep Parcels 1 and 3. Helen 
Walters was also awarded a portion of Mark Walters's retirement 
benefits to be calculated from January 1, 1980/ using the 
formula set forth in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 205-06 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). On July 31, 1989, in a second memorandum 
decision, the trial court awarded Helen Walters $1,000 for 
attorney fees "based on need and the relative ability of the 
parties to pay." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In divorce proceedings, the trial court has considerable 
discretion concerning property distribution. This court will 
not disturb the trial court's decision unless it is clearly 
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. Smith v. Smith, 751 
P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 
In distributing the parties' property, the trial court 
found that they began to carry on a marriage-like relationship 
on or about January 1, 1980. In making this finding, the court 
considered a number of factors: (1) Mark Walters stayed in 
Helen Walters*s trailer with her when he was not working out of 
state, (2) Mark Walters had Helen Walters's trailer moved onto 
a lot for which he was paying, and did not charge rent, (3) 
Helen Walters made improvements on the property such as would 
be expected of a married couple, (4) Mark Walters paid debts 
for the plaintiff including debts to the I.R.S. and the tax 
commission, and (5) while working out of state, Mark Walters 
sent Helen Walters money on which to live. 
Mark Walters challenges the trial court's property 
distribution on grounds that the trial court erred in ruling 
that their marriage relationship began January 1, 1980, and in 
distributing the property according to that ruling. Helen 
Walters argues that the trial court did not err, but rather 
used its broad discretion in distributing the parties' 
premarital and marital property. 
"When a decree of divorce is entered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, 
property, and parties. . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1) 
(1989). The Utah Supreme Court has concluded that this statute 
confers "broad discretion upon trial courts in the division of 
property, regardless of its source or time of acquisition." 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 134-35 (Utah 1987)(citations 
omitted). Further, "the purpose of property divisions is to 
allocate property in the manner which 'best serves the needs of 
the parties and best permits them to pursue their separate 
lives.*" Noble v. Npfrle, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 
1988)(quoting Burke 733 P.2d at 135)). 
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As a general rule, however, premarital property is viewed 
__ eparate property, and equity usually requires that "each 
party retain the separate property he or she brought into the 
marriage." Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). However, this rule is not invariable. "In 
fashioning an equitable property division, trial courts need 
consider all of the pertinent circumstances." Burke, 733 P.2d 
at 135. Factors generally considered are: 
the amount and kind of property to be 
divided; whether the property was acquired 
before or during the marriage; the source of 
the property; the health of the parties; the 
parties' standard of living, respective 
financial conditions, needs, and earning 
capacity; the duration of the marriage; the 
children of the marriage; the parties' ages 
at time of marriage and of divorce; what the 
parties gave up by the marriage; and the 
necessary relationship the property division 
has with the amount of alimony and child 
support to be awarded. Of particular 
concern . . . is whether one spouse has made 
any contribution toward the growth of the 
separate assets of the other spouse and 
whether the assets were accumulated or 
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties. 
Id. (Citations omitted). Thus, where unique circumstances 
exist, a trial court may reallocate premarital property as part 
of a property division incident to divorce. Haumont, 793 P.2d 
at 424-25. See also Burt v. Burt, 145 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 32 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
Implicit in this analysis is the requirement that the trial 
court, before exercising its discretionary power to distribute 
property, determine what property is premarital and what 
property is marital. To that end, the court must properly 
determine when the parties were lawfully married. 
To permit appellate review of a trial court's property-
division, the lower court must have made adequate factual 
findings. Haumont, 793 P.2d at 425. The findings should be 
"'sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached.'" Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 
199, 202-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)(quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). 
In the instant case, the findings are not altogether clear 
as to how the trial court determined what was premarital 
property and what was marital property. The court's analysis 
focused on various factors leading the court to conclude that 
the parties' marriage-like relationship began January 1, 1980. 
We disagree. Under Utah law,, the Walters' relationship could 
not be treated as a marriage prior to its solemnization on 
October 5, 1984. "Before adoption of section 30-1-4.5 in 1987, 
Utah did not recognize an unsolemnized relationship as a 
marriage, even though the parties to the relationship may have 
acted in other respects as spouses."2 Layton v. Lavton, 777 
P.2d 504, 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(citing Mattes v. Olearain, 
759 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). Further, section 
30-1-4.5 may not be applied retroactively. Id. at 505. 
Therefore, we conclude as a matter of law that the Walters' 
marriage began on October 5, 1984, the date of its 
solemnization. Property acquired before that date is 
premarital property and property acquired after is marital 
property. Specifically, Parcels 1 and 2 are premarital 
properties and Parcel 3 is marital property. Further, any 
apportionment of Mark Walters's retirement benefits should be 
calculated by using the formula in Marchant and October 5, 1984 
used as the date of the parties' marriage. 
2. Section 30-1-4.5 recognizes a marriage relationship between 
cohabitants if the relationship satisfies certain specified 
requirements. 
3. It is unclear why the court awarded Helen Walters any 
interest in Mark Walters's retirement benefits while awarding 
him no interest in her benefits. Ordinarily, the court should 
either award each spouse his or her own benefits, or award each 
a fifty percent interest in the benefits of the other, insofar 
as accumulated during the marriage. See, e.g.. Burt, 145 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 31. However, here Mark Walters's appeal of this 
issue is limited to arguing that the trial court used the wrong 
date in calculating Helen Walters's interest in his benefits. 
No argument was made that Helen Walters was entitled to no 
interest in Mark Walters's retirement benefits, nor that he was 
entitled to a corresponding interest in her benefits. 
Before a trial court can include either of the parties* 
premarital property in the marital estate, it must find unique 
circumstances that warrant disregarding the general rule that 
premarital property is separate property. See Burke, 733 P.2d 
at 135; Haumont, 793 P.2d at 424-25. Those findings must be 
sufficiently detailed to show how the court distributed the 
parties' property. Marchant, 743 P.2d at 202-03. In the case 
at bar, the only relevant unique circumstance discussed by the 
trial court was the fact that Helen Walters helped arrange for 
and make improvements to Parcels 1 and 2. The court did not 
consider any of the other factors generally considered by 
courts when equitably distributing property pursuant to a 
divorce. See Burke, 733 P.2d at 135; Haumont, 793 P.2d at 
425. Further, the findings are insufficiently detailed to 
indicate how the trial court arrived at its decision. 
Therefore, we remand to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision, and to make 
sufficiently detailed findings to support that distribution. 
On remand, the trial court should "first properly categorize 
the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as 
separate property of one or the other." Burt, 145 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 32. As a starting point then, Mark Walters is entitled 
to all of Parcels 1 and 2, and a fifty percent interest in 
Parcel 3. Helen Walters is entitled to a fifty percent 
interest in Parcel 3. Following the analysis in Burt, "the 
court should then consider the existence of exceptional 
circumstances and, if any be shown, proceed to effect an 
equitable distribution in light of those circumstances . . . ." 
Id.4 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989), a court may award 
attorney fees in a divorce proceeding. "In order to award 
attorney fees, the trial court must find the requesting party 
is in need of financial assistance and that the fees requested 
are reasonable." Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
The record contains evidence upon which to find that the 
attorney fees awarded were reasonable. Helen Walters's 
attorney testified regarding the amount and type of services 
4. For example, since Helen Walters's trailer sits on Parcel 
2, Mark Walters's separate property, the court may decide to 
treat that parcel as marital property, and Parcel 3, otherwise 
marital property, as Mark Walters*s separate property, assuming 
the two properties are of comparable value. 
rendered and submitted a supporting affidavit- However, the 
findings do not discuss the evidence upon which the trial court 
based Helen Walters*s need for such fees. Moreover, upon 
reviewing the record, it is clear Helen Walters failed to 
demonstrate her need for an award of attorney fees. The trial 
court found that neither party was presently in need of 
financial support from the other. This finding suggests that 
Helen Walters is not in need of long-term financial 
assistance. Further, the record does not reveal that she has 
any need of short-term financial assistance. Therefore, we 
reverse the trial court's award of attorney fees. 
Helen Walters also seeks an award of attorney fees on 
appeal. She first asks this court to award attorney fees 
pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 33(a) on the ground that this is a 
frivolous appeal. Obviously it is not, since appellant 
prevailed. 
Helen Walters also seeks an awa 
incurred in this appeal pursuant to 
has previously awarded attorney fee 
30-3-3. Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P. 
1989). However, as we have already 
attorney fees under section 30-3-3, 
reasonableness of, an award of atto 
determined. Riche, 784 P.2d at 470 
demonstrated a need for an award of 
Further, we see no new circumstance 
attorney fees in this appeal. Ther 
attorney fees on appeal. 
rd of her attorney fees 
section 30-3-3. This court 
s on appeal under section 
2d 156, 163 (Utah Ct. App. 
discussed, in awarding 
both the need for, and the 
rney fees must first be 
Helen Walters has not 
attorney fees below, 
s warranting an award of 
efore, we decline to award 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, we reverse and 
distribution of the parties' pr 
court's award of attorney fees 
appeal. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
********************* 
HELLEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER CV 87 2408 
-vs- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********************* 
The Court, having conducted the trial of this matter on 
February 7th, 1989 and having taken all issues under advisement, 
will rule at this time. 
The Court finds that the parties in this action are 
residents of Utah County, and the Court has jurisdiction. Each 
of the parties is granted a divorce against the other on grounds 
of irreconcilable differences. The Court finds that such grounds 
exist. The Court will not award alimony to either party. 
There was an issue raised at trial as to exactly when 
the marital relationship between the parties began. The Court 
finds, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the parties 
began to carry on a marriage like relationship on or about 
January 1, 1980, which was several years before the marriage was 
actually solemnized. 
The Court considered a number of factors in determining 
that the marital relationship began in 1980. Among these is the 
fact that the defendant stayed in the plaintiff's trailer with 
her when he was not working out of state. The defendant had the 
plaintiff's trailer moved onto a lot which he was paying for, and 
did not charge rent. The plaintiff made improvements on the 
property such as would be expected of a married couple. The 
defendant paid debts and obligations for the plaintiff including 
substantial debts to the I.R.S. and the State Tax Commission. 
The plaintiff's child with the defendant's consent was enrolled 
in school under the name Walters. While working out of state, 
the defendant sent the plaintiff money to live on. Based on the 
foregoing circumstances, the Court finds that the parties 
established a marital relationship beginning on or about January 
1st, 1980. This is an approximate date because the Court does 
not have sufficient evidence to fix an exact date. 
Because the Court considers the parties to have begun 
their marital relationship on January 1, 1980, plaintiff - is 
entitled to a share of defendant's retirement benefits accrued 
during the existence of the marriage. The formula which is to be 
used to apportion the plaintiff's share of the retirement benefit 
is found in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). 
The plaintiff will not receive any retirement benefits until the 
defendant retires. If for any reason the defendant does not 
qualify for the benefit, neither will the plaintiff. In order to 
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become 
available, plaintiff's counsel must prepare an order which is to 
be filed with the defendant's employer which will give the 
instructions for payment of retirement benefits to the plaintiff. 
The formula which should be used in the order is "one half of his 
total monthly payment times the fraction in which the numerator 
consists of the number of years or months they were married 
during which the defendant was employed by the federal government 
and the denominator is the total number of years of months 
defendant was in such employment." Marchant, at 206. The 
fraction cannot be determined until the defendant retires. If 
the parties wish to avoid the need to enter such an order, they 
may wish to consider a cash settlement of the retirement 
benefits. 
The real property which is at issue was partially 
acquired before the marriage, and partially after. Considering 
when the properties were obtained, and how they were paid for, 
the Court finds the following to be an equitable division of the 
real property. The plaintiff is to receive the property in 
Pleasant Grove where her mobile home is located free and clear. 
The defendant may keep the Highland property which he acquired 
before the marriage, and the other Pleasant Grove property 
subject to the $5,000.00 encumbrance which is still owing on that 
property. The Court finds that this is a fair division of the 
property which was either acquired or paid for during the 
marriage. 
The Court, having no evidence as to the amount of money 
in the Deseret Bank, or the America First accounts during or 
before the marriage, will award plaintiff half of each of those. 
Plaintiff is to receive $400.00 from the Deseret Bank Account, 
and $2750.00 of the America First account. 
The Court has no evidence of values with which to 
divide the disputed personal property of the parties. The 
parties are therefore given the option of either agreeing on a 
division of property between themselves, or having one party 
prepare two lists of property and the other selecting a list. If 
the parties have not used one of these methods to divide the 
property within 10 days, the Court orders the property sold and 
the proceeds divided. 
The Court will consider the issue of attorney's fees 
upon submission of affidavits by counsel. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce, and an order 
regarding retirement benefits, if necessary, and submit them to 
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to filing with the 
Court for signature. 
Dated this 15th day of February, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Robert L. Moody, Esq, 
Thomas H. Means, Esq. 
APPENDIX "C" 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
********************* 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER CV 87-2408 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********************* 
The Court, having reserved the issue of attorney's fees 
in this matter will rule, and will award the plaintiff $1,000.00 
based on need and the relative ability of the parties to pay. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare an order incorporating 
the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to filing with the Court for signature. 
Dated this 31st day of July, 1989. 
BY THe=5B^T: 
cc: Thomas H. Means, Esq. 
Robert L. Moody, Esq. 
M. HARDING, JUDGE 
APPENDIX "D" FILFO IN 
4THD!STr.:.n COURT 
THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
363 North University Avenue 
Suite 103 
P.O. Box 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
[801] 377-7980 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
V ] 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, ] 
Defendant. ; 
| FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) No. CV 87 2408 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 7th day of 
February, 1989. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented 
by her attorney of record, Thomas H. Means. Defendant also appeared 
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L. 
Moody. Both parties gave testimony, as did Plaintiff's daughter, 
Sabrina Gunderson. The parties each introduced several exhibits and 
stated their stipulations into the record. Being thereby and 
otherwise fully apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and 
filings regarding this matter, this Court, having taken the matter 
1 
under advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, now 
hereby enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff was a resident of Utah County at the time of the 
filing of her Complaint and for at least three months prior 
thereto. Defendant was a resident of Utah County at the time of the 
filing of his Counterclaim and for at least three months prior 
thereto. 
2. The parties1 marriage was solemnized on 5 October, 1984, in 
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. 
3. No children have been born of this marriage and Plaintiff 
is not pregnant. Plaintiff has a minor daughter, Shirley Schantell 
Hunter (Walters) from a prior marriage, born 15 May, 1976, who 
resided with the parties during the entire period when the parties 
resided together. Plaintiff has another daughter, Sabrina 
Gunderson, now married, who resided with the parties for a short 
period when Plaintiff's mobile home was situated at 155 South 1200 
West, Orem, Utah. 
4. During the marriage, differences have developed between the 
parties, which differences the parties have unsuccessfully 
attempted to resolve. Such differences persist. 
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5. The parties have lived separate and apart from and since on 
or about 10 November, 1987. 
6. Plaintiff and her daughter, Shirley Schantell Hunter 
(Walters) have both resided in their present residence situated at 
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, continuously since in or 
about May, 1980. Plaintifffs daughter has attended the elementary 
and secondary schools servicing that address for jher entire 
education and has been and is a member of the local ward of the 
church also servicing that address. Prior to May, 1980, Plaintiff 
and her minor daughter resided in the same mobile home which was 
then located at 155 South 1200 West, Orem, Utah. This mobile home 
has been the minor's only home. 
7. Defendant has been employed as a civilian employee of the 
federal government from and since 1967 through the time of trial. 
8. During the parties' marriage Plaintiff has been an employee 
of United States Steel Corporation except for a period when her 
employer ceased operations at the Geneva plant which was the 
location where she was employed. At the time of trial, Plaintiff 
had been re-employed by Geneva Steel for a period of approximately 
one year. 
9. Neither party appears to be presently in need of or 
entitled to the continuing financial support of the other, either 
in the form alimony or child support. 
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10. The parties established a marriage-like relationship 
several years before their marriage was actually solemnized. 
While it is not possible to determine from the evidence the precise 
date when the parties began to cohabit, Plaintiff has established 
by a preponderance of the evidence, and it is reasonable from the 
evidence to find that such relationship commenced on or about 1 
January, 1980, and continued from and since that time through the 
time the marriage was solemnized and until the parties separated. 
From and since 1 January, 1980, the parties cohabited and 
commingled their efforts and their earnings in a manner such as 
would be expected of a married couple. The evidence which supports 
such finding is as follows: 
a. The parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4 
December, 1978. 
b. At the time they met Plaintiff resided in her mobile 
home which was situated on a rental space at 155 South 1200 West, 
Orem, Utah. Although Defendant's employment sometimes required 
temporary duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided missile 
sights, beginning shortly after the parties first met, when not on 
TDY assignments, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff in her mobile 
home. 
c. In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in his own name, 
a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. At that 
4 
same time the parties moved Plaintiff's mobile home onto that pad 
where they continued to co-habit. Defendant paid for the costs of 
moving the mobile home to the Pleasant Grove location as well as 
the costs incurred for culinary water and sewer connections. 
d. Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rent for the 
placement of her mobile home on the pad or for her use of the 
realty as her residence. 
e. At various times when Defendant was on TDY 
assignments, Plaintiff helped arranged for and make physical 
improvements to the Defendant's realty on which her mobile home was 
placed and to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing and 
situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. Such improvements 
included the laying of concrete pads at each location, leveling, 
laying water lines, planting of a lawn, and construction of out-
buildings and a metal building. 
f. While employed, Plaintiff contributed her earnings 
toward the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living 
expenses. Defendant's earnings were used to make payments on the 
realty. 
g. When Plaintiff was not employed, and while Defendant 
was on TDY assignments, Defendant sent monies home to maintain 
Plaintiff and her daughter. 
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h. Defendant made contributions toward Plaintiff's 
separate debts owed to the I.R.S., the Utah State Tax Commission, 
an encumbrance on her mobile home, and debts owed for the purchase 
of her car, a T.V., and medical expenses incurred in an automobile 
accident. 
i. Although not adopted by Defendant, Plaintifffs minor 
daughter from a prior marriage, with Defendant'svknowledge and 
permission, and prior to solemnization of the marriage, attended 
school under Defendant's family name of Walters. 
j. Defendant listed his address on his federal and state 
income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah - the 
same as Plaintiff's residence - for each of the years 1979, 1980, 
1981, 1982, and 1983. 
k. Defendant listed Plaintiff's daughter "Schanny" in his 
federal income tax returns under the category of "dependent 
children who lived with you" for each of the years 1982, 1983, and 
1984. 
1. The evidence does not indicate that the parties' 
relationship changed after the solemnization of their marriage. 
11. At the time of trial Defendant maintained an account at 
Deseret Bank with a balance in an amount of $800.00 and an account 
at America First Thrift with a balance in the amount of $5500.00. 
This Court is without evidence sufficient to establish whether 
6 
these balances were accumulated prior to or after the parties 
established their marital relationship. However, the balance of the 
America First Thrift account appears to have been accumulated after 
10 November, 1987, the date on or about which Defendant was served 
with a Temporary Restraining Order which is the same date when 
Defendant withdrew $3000.00 from the account. 
12. As of the date of trial Defendant was the record owner of 
four parcels of realty, to wit: 
a. Parcel 1-
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located Plaintiff's aforementioned mobile home, a 1974 72 foot 
Concord. 
b. Parcel 2-
640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located a 1975 70 foot Brighton mobile home. 
c. Parcel 3-
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
d. Parcel 4-
746 West 600 North, Orem, Utah 
13. Parcel 1 was deeded to Defendant on 27 May, 1980. Parcel 2 
was deeded to Defendant on 18 July, 1985. Parcel 3 was deeded to 
Defendant on 4 August, 1978. Defendant entered into a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract for the purchase of parcel 3 in July, 1977, 
7 
reciting a down-payment of $2,200.00 with annual payments toward 
the balance of $5,800.00 in amounts of $1,000.00 each scheduled to 
commence in June, 1978. Defendant made a final payment for parcel 3 
in the amount of $1,682.15 on 23 May, 1981. The parties have 
stipulated that Defendant has no equitable interest in the Orem 
parcel and that he is listed as legal owner of parcel 4 only as an 
accommodation to his son to enable his son to acquire equitable 
interests in the property. Parcels 1 and 3 are not encumbered by 
any debt. Parcel 2 is encumbered by a purchase money debt with a 
balance as of the date of trial in the amount of approximately 
$5,000.00. 
14. Defendant testified as to the purchase prices and costs of 
improvements dedicated to parcels 1, 2, and 3 respectively and to 
his opinion of their respective total values as of the date of 
trial. The parties have stipulated to this Court's acceptance into 
evidence of written appraisals of the parcels offered by Plaintiff 
and conducted by Thomas C. Lamoreaux, a Certified Review Appraiser. 
This Court considers Mr. Lamoreaux1s assessment of the valuations 
of the parcels more credible than Defendant's own assessment for 
the following reasons: 
a. Defendant's assessments are based almost exclusively 
on a compilation of purchase price and costs of improvements to 
each parcel. 
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Mr. Lamoreauxfs assessments are based on several 
factors including location, access to main arterial roads and 
shopping, existence or non-existence of public improvements, 
adverse easements, and adequate drainage, room size and layout, 
insulation, adequacy of storage and closets, appeal and 
marketability, remaining economic life, availability for expansion, 
comparisons to recent sales of similar and proximate properties, 
income potential, highest and best use, and replacement cost. 
b. Defendant testified to having no significant training 
or experience as an appraiser or builder of similar properties. 
Mr. Lamoreaux's Qualifications Summary attached to his 
appraisal indicates that he has attended courses in real estate 
appraisal given by the American Institute of Appraisers, that he 
has appraised similar properties in the subject area from 1974 to 
the present, that he has experience as a supervisor and general 
contractor of residential construction from 1971 to 1974, that he 
is a designated appraiser for the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, a Certified Review Appraiser, and a licensed Realtor, 
and that he is a member of the National Association of Review 
Appraisers and the International Right of Way Association. 
Upon the foregoing, this Court accepts and adopts the 
valuations placed on the properties by Mr. Lamoreaux, to wit: 
Parcel 1, with improvements & mobile home: $20,000.00 
9 
Parcel 2, with improvements & mobile home: $20,000.00 
Parcel 3, with improvements: $10,000.00 
15. The Court finds that because of the marriage-like 
relationship that began on 1 January, 1980, Plaintiff is entitled 
to a share of Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the 
existence of the marriage-like relationship. The formula which is 
to be used to apportion the Plaintiff's share of ,the retirement 
benefit is found in Marchant v Marchant, 743 P2nd 199, (Utah App 
1987) . The Plaintiff shall not receive any retirement benefits 
until the Defendant retires. If for any reason the Defendant does 
not qualify for the benefit neither will the Plaintiff. In order to 
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become 
available, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's counsel must 
prepare an order which is to be filed with the Defendant's employer 
which will give the instructions for payment of retirement benefits 
to the Plaintiff. The formula which should be used in the Order is 
"one-half of his total monthly payment times the fraction in which 
the numerator consists of the number of years or months they 
maintained the marriage-like relationship during which the 
Defendant was employed by the federal government and the 
denominator is the total number of years or months the Defendant 
was in such employment." 
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16. With the exception of the aforementioned encumbrance 
affecting the property at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, and 
the parties1 separate debts incurred since the date of their 
separation on 10 November, 1987, there exist no marital debts for 
which either party is liable either jointly or individually. 
17. The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff should be 
awarded as her sole and separate property the parties1 1980 
Chrysler automobile. 
18. The parties have stipulated that Defendant should be 
awarded as his sole and separate property the parties1 1979 
Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
19. The parties have submitted their respective written lists 
of the other personalty of their marriage and have testified as to 
their respective claims to and needs for such personalty. The 
parties have each claimed entitlement to and need for many of the 
same items of personalty. From the evidence this Court is not able 
to ascertain or assign values to the various items of personalty 
listed or claimed by the parties nor does this Court have evidence 
from which it is able to determine, by a preponderance of the 
evidence which, if any, of such personalty is separate property as 
opposed to property accumulated during the parties' marital^ 
relationship. 
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20. Plaintiff has incurred an obligation in excess of $4000.00 
for attorney's fees reasonable to the prosecution of her Complaint. 
The hours expended as well as the hourly rate charged were 
reasonable in light of the complexity of the matter, the results 
obtained, and the hourly rate commonly charged for similar actions 
in this area. Plaintiff is in need of an award from Defendant to 
compensate her for a portion of said attorney's fees. 
12 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving her 
marriage to Defendant. 
2. Defendant is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving his 
marriage to Plaintiff. 
3. Neither party is entitled to an award of alimony or other 
order of lump sum or periodic financial support from the other. 
4. This Court need make no orders regarding liability for 
family or marital debts except that debt affecting the realty 
situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and except 
those separate debts incurred by the parties respectively after the 
date of their separation, as are addressed hereinbelow. 
5. Each party should be held solely and individually liable 
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after 
the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987. 
6. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing $400.00 
from Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and $2750.00 from Defendant's 
America First Thrift account. Defendant should be awarded the 
remainder of each account. 
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7. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts 
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in 
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant 
should be ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff. 
Defendant should retain all right, title, and interests in and to 
the parties1 realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty 
and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
Such division is equitable owing to the time periods during which 
such equities were acquired in relation to the marital relationship 
that existed between the parties both prior to and after 
solemnization of their marriage, owing to the respective 
contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the properties 
by each party, owing to the fact that such division preserves the 
long established residence of Plaintiff and her minor daughter as 
well as the minor's school and religious associations, and owing to 
the fact that such division approximates a near equal division of 
the monitory values of the properties. 
8. Defendant should be held solely and individually liable for 
all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty, 
improvements, and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West, 
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Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
9. Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and separate 
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile. 
10. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and separate 
property the parties' 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
11. It is proper that the parties1 personally as noted in 
their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and 
accepted as evidence by this Court, excluding the aforementioned 
automobiles and mobile homes, be marshalled, sold, and the proceeds 
therefrom divided equally between them. 
12. Plaintiff is entitled to a proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his 
employment during the marital relationship. Such share should be 
determined according to the formula set forth in Marchant v 
Marchant, 743 P2nd 199 (Utah App. 1987). Accordingly, Plaintiff 
should not receive her share of such benefits until Defendant 
retires. If for any reason, Defendant does not qualify for such 
benefits, neither will Plaintiff. Plaintiff's proportionate share 
should be one half (50%) of the total amount of all of Defendant's 
monthly benefit payments multiplied by the fraction in which the 
numerator is the number of months comprising the period beginning 
on 1 January, 1980, and ending on the date of trial of this matter, 
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(109 months) and the denominator is the total number of months 
Defendant is employed by the federal government. The fraction 
cannot be determined until such time as Defendant shall retire. If 
Defendant separates from civil service in advance of retirement, 
and withdraws his contributions, Plaintiff should receive a portion 
of Defendant's refund based upon the above-noted fraction. 
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of such portion of Defendant's 
civil service retirement benefits as well as a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order setting forth her rights in Defendant's civil 
service retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the 
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums 
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth 
hereinabove. 
13. It is reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as and for her 
reasonable attorney's fees the sum of $1000.00. 
Dated this y day of A«gwrt, 1989. 
Approved as to form: 
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APPENDIX "E" 
OP* 
THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
363 North University 
Suite 103 
P.O. Box 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
[801] 377-7980 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
v ] 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, ] 
Defendant. ] 
AMENDED 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
| No. CV 87 2408 
This matter; having come on regularly for trial on the 7th day 
of February, 1989, and this Court, having taken the matter under 
advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, and having 
entered its written FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
her marriage to Defendant, 
2. Defendant is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
his marriage to Plaintiff. 
3. Each party is hereby held solely and individually liable 
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after 
1 
the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987. Each party shall 
hold the other harmless for any and all such debts incurred in 
his/her individual name after 10 November, 1987. 
4. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing a 
$4 00.00 share of Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and a $2750.00 
share of Defendant's America First Thrift account. Defendant is 
hereby awarded the remainder of each account. 
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties' equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts 
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in 
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. More 
particularly described as: 
Lot 9, Plat D, Pleasant Grove Mobile Home Estates 
Defendant is hereby ordered to deed and deliver such realty to 
Plaintiff. 
6. It is hereby ordered that Defendant retain all right, 
title, and interests in and to the parties' realty and improvements 
- including the mobile home - situated at 640 South 50 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty and improvements situated at 
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
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7. Defendant shall be and is hereby held solely and 
individually liable for all debt encumbering, associated with, or 
owing for the realty, improvements, and mobile home situated at 640 
South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant shall hold Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
8. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and separate 
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile. 
9. Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate 
property, the parties1 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
10. It is hereby ordered that the parties1 personalty as noted 
in their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and 
accepted as evidence by this Court - but excepting the 
aforementioned automobiles and mobile homes - be marshalled, sold, 
and the proceeds therefrom divided equally between the parties. 
11. Plaintiff is hereby awarded a proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his 
employment with the federal government during the marital 
relationship, which is and shall consist of one half (50%) of the 
total amount of all of Defendant's monthly benefit payments 
multiplied by the fraction in which the numerator is 109 and the 
denominator is the total number of months Defendant is employed by 
the federal government. The fraction shall be determined at such 
time as Defendant shall retire. Plaintiff shall not receive her 
3 
share of such benefits until Defendant retires• If Defendant 
separates from civil service in advance of retirement and withdraws 
his contributions, Plaintiff shall receive a portion of such refund 
based on the above-noted fraction. If for any reason, Defendant 
does not qualify for such benefits, neither will Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff is hereby granted and awarded such proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits as,,well as a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order setting forth her rights in 
Defendant's retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the 
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums 
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth 
hereinabove and hereby granted and awarded to her. 
12. Plaintiff is hereby granted and Defendant is hereby 
ordered to pay as and for Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees 
the sum of $1000.00. /J' 
Dated this «J7C/_ day of August, 1989. 
By^thcKCou&t: 
Ra*Q&. Harding, 
Ju|ge 
Fourth Judicial District 
Utah County 
Approved as to form: 
Robert L. Md^ odM 
Attorney for Defendant 
APPENDIX n F " 
30-1-4.5 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized. 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be 
legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out 
of a contract between two consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the 
provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and gen-
eral reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section 
must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one 
year following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage 
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be 
proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases. 
History: C. 1953, 30-1-4.5, enacted by L. ter 246, or the\application of any provision to 
1987, ch. 246, § 2. any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1987, ch. remainder of the chapter is to be given effect 
246, § 5 provided that if any provision of Chap- without the invalid provision or application. 
30-1-5. Marriage solemnization — Before unauthorized 
person — Validity. 
No marriage solemnized before any person professing to have authority 
therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority, if consummated in the 
belief of the parties or either of them that he had such authority and that they 
have been lawfully married. 
History: R.S. 1898 & CX. 1907, § 1187; Cross-References. — Authorized person re-
C.L. 1917, § 2970; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, quired to solemnize marriage, § 30-1-2. 
40-1-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Foreign common-law marriages. where such marriages are recognized. In re 
This section does not render valid a common- Vetas' Estate, 110 Utah 187, 170 P.2d 183 
law marriage entered into in a foreign state (1946). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 52 Am. Jur. 2d Marriage lack of legal authority of person solemnizing it, 
§§ 39, 106. 13 A.L.R.4th 1323. 
C.J.S. — 55 C J.S. Marriage § 29. Key Numbers. — Marriage *» 27. 
AX.R. — Validity of marriage as affected by 
